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REMOVING THE BLINDERS IN FEDERAL SENTENCING:




A Korean-American man who spent the first forty years of his
life in Korea pled guilty to bribing an Internal Revenue Service agent,
but argued that he should be granted a departure from the United
States Sentencing Guidelines ("sentencing guidelines") because his
cultural beliefs made him unlike the typical defendant convicted of
this crime.' He claimed that because of his Korean cultural upbring-
ing he believed the money he gave to the agent was not only lawful,
but also socially mandated.2 The district court refused the departure,
stating that the sentencing guidelines denied it the authority to
consider the defendant's culture.' On appeal, the Third Circuit noted
that culture is uncomfortably close to the prohibited sentencing factor
of national origin but declined to decide the propriety of culture as a
sentencing factor and affirmed the district court's decision on other
grounds.4
In the Ninth Circuit, a Mexican-American man convicted of ille-
gal reentry argued that the district court abused its discretion by not
taking into account the degree of his cultural assimilation to United
* J.D. candidate, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology, 2003;
B.A., English and History, DePaul University, 2000. The author wishes to thank Professor
Sarah Harding and Professor Doug Godfrey for their invaluable comments and insight and
Jason Braswell, Tracy Cassidy, Daniel Mayerfeld, and Michael Shapiro for their editing,
comments, and assistance.
1. United States v. Yu, 954 F.2d 951, 953 (3d Cir. 1992).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 954.
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States norms.' The Ninth Circuit agreed, noting that it would be
''unusual" to punish the defendant to the same extent as others
convicted of this crime, sympathizing that the United States contained
his family and the only way of life he had ever known. Thus, the
Ninth Circuit found that a defendant's degree of assimilation to
American culture is relevant in sentencing.6 Other circuits followed
suit.7 Despite this willingness to consider a defendant's culture when
that culture is consistent with American mores, no circuit has stated
that a defendant's degree of cultural difference, which might serve to
justify or explain a defendant's rationale for committing a particular
crime, is an appropriate consideration for district court judges in
making sentencing determinations.
8
Thus, defendants such as the reentry defendant, Lipman, who
have assimilated to United States' culture and should know that their
actions are illegal, are garnering sympathy from the courts. In stark
contrast defendants such as the bribery defendant Yu, who have
retained the culture of their native lands, which may reasonably
diminish the likelihood that they knew their actions were illegal, are
being treated sternly by the courts for their lack of assimilation. This
Note uses the term "cultural assimilation" to describe claims like
Lipman's-the notion that one's degree of assimilation to the United
5. United States v. Lipman, 133 F.3d 726, 729 (9th Cir. 1998).
6. Id. at 731.
7. See United States v. Rodriguez-Montelongo, 263 F.3d 429 (5th Cir. 2001); United States
v. Sanchez-Valencia, 148 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 1998).
8. The Seventh Circuit recently attempted to depict the propriety of allowing a cultural
difference claim throughout the circuits. United States v. Guzman, 236 F.3d 830, 832 (7th Cir.
2001). It found that the Eighth Circuit had approved the use of cultural considerations as a
basis for downward departure, in limited situations, without considering the proscriptions of
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5H.10. Id. (citing United States v. Decora, 177 F.3d 676,
679 (8th Cir. 1999); United States v. One Star, 9 F.3d 60, 61 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v. Big
Crow, 898 F.2d 1326, 1331-32 (8th Cir. 1990)). These cases, however, do not depict the typical
cultural difference claim; rather, all of these situations involved downward departures to
defendants of Native American descent based upon a degree of perseverance that the
sentencing judge found peculiarly high despite growing up with the struggles and limitations of
an Indian reservation. Decora, 177 F.3d at 679-80; One Star, 9 F.3d at 61; Big Crow, 898 F.2d at
1331. This ambiguity will be discussed more, infra, in Part II.
The Seventh Circuit also concluded that the Tenth and Second Circuits decided that
cultural difference could never be a basis for mitigation. Guzman. 236 F.3d at 832 (citing
United States v. Contreras, 180 F.3d 1204, 1212 n.4 (10th Cir. 1999); United States v. Sprei, 145
F.3d 528, 536 (2d Cir. 1998)). Again, the support for this proposition is ambiguous. It is not
clear that the Tenth Circuit conclusively held that culture could never be a basis for downward
departure, and it rejected Contreras' argument, finding that it did not implicate culture, but the
forbidden factor of religion. Contreras, 180 F.3d at 1212 n.4. Further, Contreras has not been
cited by any other court, besides the Seventh Circuit, as holding this position. Similarly, the
Second Circuit struck down Sprei's departure because it was based upon the forbidden factor of
religion, and did not mention or discuss cultural difference in its holding. Sprei, 145 F.3d at 536.
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States' culture should be a basis for departure for reentry convictions
because, unlike those who illegally reenter for economic reasons,
their motivation was to be reunited with aspects of their cultural
upbringing which can only be found in the United States. This Note
employs the term "cultural difference" to describe claims such as
Yu's-the notion that certain distinctions between the defendant's
minority culture and that of the majority should be a basis for a
mitigated sentence.
Yu's district court judge felt that cultural difference could not be
a basis for departure, presumably due to proscriptions in the sentenc-
ing guidelines.' Prior to the enactment of the sentencing guidelines in
1984, federal district court judges were allotted such a wide range of
discretion in sentencing that serious injustices were occurring.10
Criminals with similar crimes and similar histories were not given
similar sentences due to the wide discretion enjoyed by judges." In
order to minimize these disparities and create uniformity in sentenc-
ing, Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act of 198412 and
created the Sentencing Commission to develop guidelines for sen-
tencing. 3 While the Supreme Court has affirmed that these guide-
lines do not usurp all the discretion of a trial judge in sentencing,'14
there are certain factors that are prohibited from sentencing consid-
erations: race, sex, national origin, creed, religion, and socioeconomic
status. 5 Consideration of a defendant's cultural difference is not
specifically proscribed under the sentencing guidelines; however,
many courts have expressed concern that cultural difference is too
similar to consideration of prohibited factors, especially race and
national origin.16 This view allows the disparity of treating a defen-
dant who acted in ignorance of American law and in compliance with
9. Yu, 954 F.2d at 953.
10. Bruce M. Seyla & Matthew R. Kipp, An Examination of Emerging Departure
Jurisprudence Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 4 (1991).
11. S. REP. No. 98-473, at 38 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3220, 3221.
12. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3559 (2000).
13. Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 92 (1996).
14. Id.
15. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5Hl.10 (2002).
16. See United States v. Guzman, 236 F.3d 830, 833 (7th Cir. 2001) ("[W]e lean to the view
that section 5Hl.10 of the guidelines does forbid consideration of ethnicity or 'cultural heritage'
in the sentencing decision."); United States v. Tomono, 143 F.3d 1401, 1404 n.2 (lth Cir. 1998)
("[C]onsidering any 'cultural differences' attributable solely to a defendant's country of origin
comes uncomfortably close to considering the defendant's national origin itself.").
2003] 447
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his or her own cultural norms the same as one who committed a
similar crime fully aware of the wrongfulness of his or her actions.
Because culture implicates a different set of considerations and
norms than do prohibited factors such as race and national origin,
courts should distinguish cultural difference and view it as a proper
departure ground under the sentencing guidelines. This would still
comport with the objective of treating similarly situated defendants in
the same manner by further delineating which groups of defendants
are similarly situated. A cultural difference consideration would have
the effect of treating those whose own culture dictates variant behav-
ior differently than those who have committed the same crime but
have been fully enculturated by the values and beliefs of the domi-
nant society.1 7 Moreover, allowing a cultural difference claim in
sentencing would help eliminate the disparity of lenient sentencing
consideration between immigrants more assimilated to American
norms and mores and immigrants who have retained their national or
ethnic diversity. Considering cultural differences in sentencing would
thereby further our nation's ideals of fostering multiculturalism and
pluralism by recognizing cultural beliefs and practices of those other
than the American majority. Further, allowing departures based
upon culture would not compromise the major goals and policies of
sentencing, but instead would advance them. Thus, the time-honored
tradition of the district court judge considering every defendant as an
individual with unique attributes that will "sometimes mitigate,
sometimes magnify, the crime and punishment to ensue"'18 is pre-
served.
This Note explores the injustices that result from the application
of rigid, uniform sentences without regard to defendants as individu-
als whose cultural beliefs and practices may serve as reasonable,
legitimate, and just means for mitigation. In Part I, this Note reviews
17. Using culture in this context would aid in "bridg[ing] the gap that currently exists in the
law between moral and legal guilt." Alison Dundes Renteln, A Justification of the Cultural
Defense as Partial Excuse, 2 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 437,443 (1993).
Professor Gomez also urges the consideration of culture as a mitigating factor in
sentencing in situations where "cultural uniqueness peculiar to the offender's race exists and is
causally related to the crime" but does not consider the disparity of allowing cultural assimila-
tion claims in sentencing while not allowing cultural difference claim. Placido G. Gomez, The
Dilemma of Difference: Race as a Sentencing Factor, 24 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 357, 360
(1993). This is due to Professor Gomez's overarching goal of allowing the consideration of race
in sentencing, especially in situations where the judge learns that in some part of the criminal
process the defendant has been subject to racial bias. Id. at 385. This Note distinguishes culture
from race, and urges that culture should be a proper sentencing consideration.
18. Koon, 518 U.S. at 113.
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the history and background of the sentencing guidelines. Part II
highlights cases in which departures from the sentencing guidelines
have and have not been granted based on the culture of the defen-
dant. For purposes of analogy, Part III explores the leading argu-
ments proffered by those who favor use of the cultural defense, with
emphasis on examining how a cultural defense furthers the goals of
punishment. Part IV of this Note establishes that culture is distinct
from prohibited considerations under the sentencing guidelines. It
then analyzes how cultural considerations are more applicable to
sentencing determinations than as defenses to liability. Finally, this
Note illustrates the important policies that a cultural difference factor
effectuates: multiculturalism, pluralism, and the goals and policies
inherent in criminal sentencing.
I. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES
Prior to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,19 a defendant's sen-
tence remained largely within the purview of the federal district court
judge, who "enjoyed broad discretion in determining whether and
how long an offender should be incarcerated. '"2° In principle, a
defendant's sentence was determined by three different entities.21
First, each crime had a predetermined range of sentences determined
by Congress. 2 Second, the sentencing judge administered a sentence
based upon this range. However, the ranges were often so expansive
that the judge was left with almost unfettered discretion in sentenc-
ing.23 This power was based upon the notion that the district court
judge had the most intimate knowledge of each individual defendant
and thus was most knowledgeable about each person's possibility for
"reform or recidivism. ' '24 The third party that had control of the
defendant's sentence was the Parole Commission. A parole officer
had the ability to release a defendant prior to the expiration of his or
her sentence based upon the officer's character assessment of the
defendant.25
19. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3559 (2000).
20. Koon, 518 U.S. at 92.
21. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 364-65 (1989).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Glueck, The Sentencing Problem, reprinted in THE PROBLEM OF SENTENCING 61-62




Of the three entities, the sentencing judge was the target of the
most criticism. As "offenders with similar histories, convicted of
similar crimes, committed under similar circumstances" 26 were given
vastly different sentences as a result of the discretion of the sentenc-
ing judge, criticisms arose depicting federal sentencing as being
"arbitrary and even sadistic, ' 27 resulting in sentences based largely
upon the judge's emotive character.
28
As a result of these disparities, Congress passed the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984, creating a commission charged with establishing
and maintaining a uniform set of sentencing guidelines. 29 The pur-
poses of the commission are to "provide certainty and fairness" in
sentencing and to avoid unreasonable disparities in sentences "while
maintaining sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentences
when warranted[.] '"3 ° The Sentencing Reform Act also permits the
defendant or the government to appeal irregularities in applying the
guidelines.3
In applying the sentencing guidelines, the judge identifies the
base level offense of the particular crime.3 2 If no special features are
present, the judge applies the relevant guidelines.3 3 This type of case
would be typical of what the Sentencing Commission titles a "heart-
land" case, embodying what the guidelines describe. 4 If special
features are present in the case, it is removed from the heartland of
typical cases and the judge must determine whether "there exists an
aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not
26. S. REP. NO. 98-473, at 38 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3220, 3221.
27. Bennett, The Sentencing-Its Relation to Crime and Rehabilitation, reprinted in THE
PROBLEM OF SENTENCING 56, 59 (Monrad G. Paulsen rep., 1964) ("That some judges are
arbitrary and even sadistic in their sentencing practices is notoriously a matter of record. By
reason of senility or a virtually pathological emotional complex some judges summarily impose
the maximum on defendants convicted of certain types of crimes or all types of crimes.").
28. Id. at 58.
The personality of the judge is often a potent factor which can outweigh the more
factual data available to him in arriving at a sentencing determination. His emotional
reaction when some facet of the crime or the defendant's demeanor strikes a sensitive
chord in his personality make-up may bring about a wildly inappropriate sentence.
Id. In addition, sentencing decisions were generally unappealable. See, e.g., Gurera v. United
States, 40 F.2d 338, 340-41 (8th Cir. 1930) ("If there is one rule in the federal criminal practice
which is firmly established, it is that the appellate court has no control over a sentence which is
within the limits allowed by a statute.").
29. United States v. Koon, 518 U.S. 81, 92 (1996).
30. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (2000).
31. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)-(b) (2000).
32. Koon, 518 U.S. at 88.
33. United States v. Rivera, 994 F.2d 942, 949 (1st Cir. 1993).
34. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch.1, pt. A, introductory cmt. (2002).
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adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in
formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different
from that described. ' '31 The feature that took the case out of the
heartland must then be examined and characterized as either an
encouraged,36 discouraged,37 or a forbidden 38 departure ground from
the relevant guideline. Although departure grounds have been
available since the inception of the guidelines, judges may have felt
restricted in issuing departures39 until the reaffirmation by the Su-
preme Court of such departures in Koon.40
II. IMPACT OF THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES ON CRIMINALS WHO
HAVE ARGUED CULTURE AS A BASIS FOR DOWNWARD
DEPARTURES
A. Pre-Koon Cultural Differences Cases
Prior to Koon, federal courts of appeals did not provide a ready
answer as to whether district courts were authorized to issue sentenc-
ing departures based upon a defendant's culture. While no court of
appeals explicitly held that culture was an inappropriate basis for
downward departures, those faced with the question either expressed
35. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1994). In order to determine whether the factor was taken into
consideration by the Sentencing Commission, a federal judge is directed to consider statements
from the Sentencing Commission, such as the guidelines, policy statements, and any official
commentary. If the factor is not discussed in any official statements of the sentencing guide-
lines, the federal judge should then issue an appropriate sentence, bearing in mind the purposes
of sentencing and the guidelines. Id.
36. An encouraged factor is one that "the Commission has not been able to take into
account fully in formulating the guidelines." U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.0
(2002). If the factor is mentioned in the guidelines, the judge should consider whether the factor
is "present to a degree substantially in excess of that which ordinarily is involved in the offense,"
and if so, a departure may be warranted. Id.
37. The guidelines provide features that would not normally take a case out of the
heartland and warrant a departure. See, e.g., id. § 5H1.1 (defendant's age); id. § 5H1.2
(defendant's education and vocational skills); id. § 5H1.3 (defendant's mental and emotional
condition); id. § SH1.4 (defendant's physical condition); id. § 5H1.6 (defendant's family and
community ties); id. §5H1.11 (defendant's military service, public service, or other good works).
38. Factors which may never take a case out of the heartland include considerations such as
race, sex, national origin, creed, religion, and socioeconomic status. Id. § 5Hl.10. The other
prohibited factors include: lack of guidance as a youth and similar circumstances, id. § 5H1.12;
drug or alcohol dependence, id. § 5H1.4; economic hardship from personal, trade, or business
financial difficulties, id. § 5K2.12; and post-sentencing rehabilitative efforts made by the
defendant when resentencing the defendant for the same offense, id. § 5K2.19.
39. See Frank 0. Bowman, III, Places in the Heartland: Departure Jurisprudence After
Koon, 9 FED. SENTENCING REP. 19, 19 (1996).
40. United States v. Koon, 518 U.S. 81, 92 (1996).
20031
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conflicting views41 or negative views 4 on the use of culture as a
mitigating factor.
In 1989 and 1990, the Eighth Circuit released two opinions
resulting in conflicting views as to whether culture is an appropriate
mitigating factor. First, in Natal-Rivera, the Eighth Circuit affirmed a
district court's decision to disregard the defendant's culture in sen-
tencing. 43 Natal-Rivera argued that the sentencing guidelines were
unconstitutional because they foreclosed the opportunity for her to
present evidence regarding her cultural background. 4 She advanced
the theory that she was unlike the typical defendant convicted of drug
conspiracy and distribution, since her Puerto Rican culture dictated
that she follow the orders of her husband, her coconspirator in these
crimes.45 The Eighth Circuit affirmed the constitutionality of the
sentencing guidelines and addressed the cultural argument by citing
cases as far back as 1836 that deemed culture irrelevant in sentencing
and the criminal law.46 The court noted that it was logical to assume
that Congress could prevent considerations of culture as a basis for
mitigation in sentencing, but did not answer the question of whether
it interpreted Congress as doing so.4
At odds with the result in Natal-Rivera is the Eighth Circuit's de-
cision in Big Crow, 48 released only one year later. In Big Crow,49 the
Eighth Circuit affirmed a downward departure due to the defendant's
41. Compare United States v. Natal-Rivera, 879 F.2d 391 (8th Cir. 1989) (discouraging
cultural considerations in sentencing), with United States v. Big Crow, 898 F.2d 1326 (8th Cir.
1990) (affirming cultural considerations in sentencing).
42. See United States v. Yu, 954 F.2d 951, 954-55 (3d Cir. 1992).
43. 879 F.2d at 392-93. Natal-Rivera and the man she cohabitated with and referred to as
her husband were indicted by a grand jury for distribution of cocaine and for conspiracy to
distribute cocaine. Id. Natal-Rivera pled guilty to one count of distribution, which resulted in a
sentence of fifty-one months of imprisonment; her paramour was sentenced to 121 months of
imprisonment. Id.
44. Id. at 393.
45. Id. at 392.
46. Id. at 393 (citing Rex v. Esop, 173 Eng. Rep. 203 (Cent. Crim. Ct. 1836)).
47. ld.
48. United States v. Big Crow, 898 F.2d 1326, 1331 (8th Cir. 1990). Interestingly, as
opposed to Natal-Rivera, which involved a defendant convicted of a victimless crime, Big Crow
involved a conviction for assault and battery.
49. Big Crow was convicted by a jury for assault with a dangerous weapon and assault
resulting in serious bodily injury. Id. at 1328. His total offense level was twenty-three, which
put his sentence range at forty-six to fifty-four months. Id. at 1329. The district court entered a
two-point reduction for acceptance of responsibility, reducing the offense level to twenty-one,
which warranted a sentencing range of thirty-seven to forty-six months. Id. The district court,
however, then departed from the guidelines and sentenced Big Crow to twenty-four months and
two years of supervised release. Id. Both the two-point reduction and departure were appealed
by the Government. Id.
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perseverance in overcoming the difficult conditions he faced growing
up on an Native American reservation.5 " The Seventh Circuit has
interpreted this case as endorsing culture as a consideration for
downward departures.51 The Big Crow court, however, never stated
that it was affirming the defendant's departure based upon Big
Crow's degree of cultural difference and the court's analysis does not
support a cultural difference claim. For instance, a departure based
upon cultural difference might evidence that the defendant did not
know that her actions were unlawful because of her disparate cultural
beliefs. In contrast, Big Crow was given a departure based upon his
resilience in the face of adversity,52 thereby likening the crime to
aberrant behavior, in which recidivism was unlikely. While not
mentioning culture, the Seventh Circuit may have interpreted Big
Crow as a cultural difference case because of the Eighth Circuit's
seemingly preemptive desire to respond to the argument that race,
national origin, and socioeconomic status are prohibited areas under
the guidelines. 3 The court declared that the prohibition could not
have been intended to be "sweeping" considering that the Senate
Judiciary Committee reported that "the requirement of neutrality...
is not a requirement of blindness. 5 4
Bearing in mind these decisions, the Third Circuit, in the major-
ity and dissenting opinions of Yu, sharply criticized the use of cultural
evidence in sentencing, but also extended one of the most exhaustive
arguments as to why culture should be a mitigating factor.55 Yu
involved a Korean-American defendant who had spent the first forty-
six years of his life in Korea before immigrating to the United States
to begin life anew as a factory worker.5 6 Four years after coming to
the United States, he opened his own successful small business. 57 In
1988 and 1989, Yu's tax return was subject to an audit, during which
50. Id. at 1331 (quoting Transcript of Sentencing Hearing at 201-03) ("In this particular
case, you never had a criminal record.... You have been a hard worker in your job, and not
too pleasant of a job. You at least tried in your young life to overcome many of the difficult
conditions, which the court knows exists [sic] in Indian country.").
51. United States v. Guzman, 236 F.3d 830, 832 (7th Cir. 2001).
52. See, e.g., Big Crow, 898 F.2d at 1331-32 (citing the unemployment rate on the
defendant's reservation and then noting that the defendant had been steadily employed for five
years).
53. Id. at 1332 n.3.
54. Id.
55. United States v. Yu, 954 F.2d 951 (3d Cir. 1992).
56. Id. at 952-53.
57. Id. at 953.
2003]
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Yu offered the examining agent money on two separate occasions in
the amounts of $250 and $5,000.58
Yu pled guilty to bribing an IRS examining agent, but argued
that the district court judge should have granted him a downward
departure in sentencing because his actions were consistent with
Korean culture5 9 Yu claimed that he had considered the money to be
"honorariums," a practice that he claimed he believed to be not only
lawful, but improper if not done.60 He testified that in Korea, "citi-
zens frequently give underpaid government bureaucrats something
under the table; and that failure to give such an 'honorarium' is
considered an insult."' 6' Yu argued that cultural considerations in
sentencing are distinct from arguments based upon the prohibited
factor of national origin.6
2
The Third Circuit evaded the question of whether culture was
distinct from national origin,63 in part because Yu was not an entirely
sympathetic defendant. At the time of his unlawful conduct, Yu had
been engaged in the business of tax preparation in the U.S. for almost
ten years.64 In addition, Yu would not directly answer whether he
believed his actions to be unlawful at the time he made them.
65
From this, the majority could have dismissed Yu's cultural claim
as unfounded and unreasonable without admonishing the use of
culture in general. Nonetheless, without answering the question of
whether culture is an appropriate mitigating factor,66 the court went




61. Id. at 959 (Becker, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 953. The Government defended the refusal to depart based on the belief that
culture is akin to national origin. In addition to arguing that the two are distinct, Yu also argued
that the national origin provision was a "non-binding policy statement," and thus was only
discretionary to courts. Id. at 953-54. While not answering the first argument, the Third Circuit
did reaffirm that the provision's status as a policy statement did not alter its binding character
on the courts. Id. at 954.
63. Id. ("Thus, we prefer to leave for another day the question of whether a foreign culture
is subsumed within the term 'national origin,' a factor which the Sentencing Commission,
faithful to its congressional mandate, 28 U.S.C. § 994(d), has deemed irrelevant in the
determination of a sentence.").
64. Id.
65. Id. ("This point was not lost on us when we examined the record and thus at oral
argument we directly asked whether Yu contended that, at the time of the offenses, he thought
his conduct in bribing the agent was consistent with the culture of this country. We did not
receive an affirmative response.").
66. Id.
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considerations in sentencing. The majority voiced concerns over
whether culture could be confined to those from foreign shores or
whether cultures within American borders should also be consid-
ered.67 The majority also felt that culture was wrapped into the
prohibited consideration of national origin.6 8 To the majority, these
issues were more akin to an exercise in futility, evidenced by its final
thoughts on the use of culture in sentencing: "[I]t is doubtful at best
that cultural differences are allowable under the guidelines."69
Yu is probably most noteworthy, however, for its dissent by
Judge Becker, which was the first comprehensive opinion in support
of a cultural difference departure ground. He began by stating that
there are many conceivable reasons why cultural difference is rele-
vant to sentencing.70 He noted that cultural difference sheds light
upon a defendant's likelihood for reform or recidivism, since one who
mistakenly believed her actions were socially and legally acceptable
might be less likely to repeat the action in the future. There might
also be a lower societal desire for retribution against one that acted in
compliance with cultural beliefs because the person might be seen as
less blameworthy.7
Judge Becker emphasized, however, that the real issue in Yu was
not whether culture should be relevant in sentencing, because un-
doubtedly there are situations where it is, but rather the issue was
whether culture is legally relevant.72 Thus, Judge Becker believed
that the primary analysis in Yu should have centered upon a compre-
hensive examination of whether national origin is distinct from
culture-a topic that the majority chose not to tackle.
In resolving this issue, Judge Becker applied a plain meaning ap-
proach towards the sentencing guidelines, which led him to the
conclusion that culture and national origin are distinct from each
other.73 For Judge Becker, the term national origin only embodies its
plain- meaning, one's nation of birth, which is more limited in defini-
tion than culture.74 To show that culture implicates more than just
67. Id. The Third Circuit raised the issue regarding its own institutional competency to
address these questions and stated it felt that the answers to the problems they identified were
best left to the Congressional Sentencing Commission. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 954 n.2 (citing United States v. Natal-Rivera, 879 F.2d 391 (8th Cir. 1989)).
70. Id. at 956 (Becker, J., dissenting).
71. Id. (Becker, J., dissenting).
72. Id. (Becker, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 958 (Becker, J., dissenting).
74. Id. (Becker, J., dissenting).
2003]
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place of birth, he analogized that "[m]any Chicanos are American-
born but have a distinct culture. A foreign-born person may have
moved here as a child but have no noticeable cultural differences.
75
This suggests that culture is not dependent upon national origin, but
rather turns upon factors broader and more expansive than one's
place of birth.
He also addressed issues in the mechanics and application of a
cultural difference claim. He acknowledged that not every cultural
difference claim would be admissible under the guidelines. For
instance, if a defendant offered that her cultural background was
based upon being poverty-stricken, the sentencing guidelines already
provide that "socioeconomic status may not be considered in sentenc-
ing. ' 76 Therefore, judges must dissect a defendant's claim of cultural
difference and determine if the defendant is really asking for a
departure based on a prohibited area.77 If the cultural difference
claim is based upon some factor not considered by the Sentencing
Commission such as "excusable ignorance of American cultural
norms" or based upon the existence of "extraordinary informal
punishment in his or her ethnic community,"78 Judge Becker stated
that he saw nothing in the sentencing guidelines that would bar this
type of claim.79
Despite Judge Becker's detailed analysis of the distinctions be-
tween culture and national origin, the Third Circuit left the issue
unsettled as to whether culture was a proper basis for downward
departures. Thus, district court judges, such as the one in Yu who
stated that he had not denied the departure based upon discretionary
factors, but rather because he believed the departure to be im-
proper, 0 were left with no guidance as to whether the departures
were warranted.8'
75. Id. (Becker, J., dissenting).
76. Id. (Becker, J., dissenting) (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.10).
77. Id. (Becker, J., dissenting).
78. Id. (Becker, J., dissenting). Yu argued that since his name was published in newspapers
regarding the offense, he had already suffered a form of societal punishment that exists in
Korean culture-loss of face. Id. at 953.
79. Id. at 959 (Becker, J., dissenting).
80. "[J]ust so that it's clear I'm not exercising any discretion not to use a power that I have,
I'm holding that I lack the power." Id. at 953.
81. See also United States v. Khang, 36 F.3d 77 (9th Cir. 1994). Khang involved defen-
dants, born and raised in Laos, who were convicted of smuggling opium into the United States.
Id. at 78. They claimed that the opium was a medicinal pain reliever used in Hmong culture;
they did not know opium was illegal for this purpose in the U.S., and that they planned to give it
to their father. Id. However, the Ninth Circuit found that it did not need to address the
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B. Reaffirmation of Departure Jurisprudence: Koon
Part of the reason why the district court judge in Yu felt that he
did not have the power to issue a departure based upon culture could
have been due to the fact that after the adoption of the sentencing
guidelines, district court judges may have felt restricted in considering
discretionary factors for the purpose of issuing departures . 2 Perhaps
to curtail this reaction, in 1996 the Supreme Court reaffirmed the
historic power and authority of the district court judge in sentencing. 83
Koon involved the sentencing of the officers convicted of violat-
ing Rodney King's constitutional rights under color of law, pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. § 242.84 After computing various factors, such as use of a
dangerous weapon and the victim's bodily injury, into the sentencing
calculation, the district court determined that the base offense level
was twenty-seven, which carried a prison sentence of seventy to
eighty-seven months.85  From this, the district court proceeded to
depart downward eight levels after reviewing factors such as the
victim's provocation of the offense, the likelihood that the defendants
would be targeted in prison for abuse, and the fact that the court did
not deem the defendants violent persons from whom society needed
protection.86 This dropped the sentencing range to thirty to thirty-
seven months imprisonment.87 The court of appeals reviewed this
mitigation de novo, resulting in a reversal of the eight level depar-
ture .88
question of whether culture was distinct from national origin because the defendants did not
prove the basic facts underlying their attempt at a cultural difference claim in sentencing. Id. at
79. While they claimed they did not know opium was illegal, they smuggled the opium into the
U.S. in batteries. Id. at 78-79. This case is just another example of the question of cultural
difference being presented and remaining unanswered.
82. See Bowman, supra note 39, at 19.
83. Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 92 (1996).
84. Id. at 88. The case involved the violent beating of a black motorist, Rodney King, by
officers of the Los Angeles Police Department. Id. at 85-87. The officers were initially tried in
state court for assault with a deadly weapon and excessive use of force by an officer. Id. at 87.
The trial ended in an acquittal on all the counts except one, which resulted in a hung jury. Id. at
87-88. The jury verdict incited widespread, devastating riots throughout Los Angeles. Id. at 88.
85. Id. at 89.
86. Id. at 89-90. For the mitigation, the court also looked to the likely job termination the
defendants were facing, their probable inability to find similar work, the burden that the state
and federal prosecution had already caused, and the fact that a severe punishment was unlikely
to further any theory of punishment since the defendants were not likely to repeat their actions.
Id.
87. Id. at 90.
88. Id. at 90-91.
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The U.S. Supreme Court found that the de novo standard of re-
view applied by the court of appeals was incorrect because it robbed
too much of the sentencing discretion properly held by the district
court.89 The Supreme Court reaffirmed the belief that district courts
have a particular institutional advantage over appellate courts in
sentencing because the trial court is closer to the witnesses, has better
control over the facts, and is presented with sentencing determina-
tions on an ordinary basis.90 In addition, the Court highlighted the
departure procedures set forth by the sentencing guidelines, empha-
sizing that the Sentencing Reform Act acknowledged the wisdom and
necessity that sentencing incorporate individual circumstances. 91
Quoting an earlier opinion, the Court restated that, besides the
prohibited factors, the sentencing guidelines "place essentially no
limit on the number of potential factors that may warrant a depar-
ture." 92 With this affirmation of the power of district courts in consid-
ering individualized factors in sentencing and issuing departures when
warranted, the Supreme Court adopted and applied an abuse of
discretion standard for review of sentencing decisions. 93
C. Post-Koon Cultural Difference Cases
Even after the Supreme Court's affirmation of departure juris-
prudence in Koon, no circuit has expressly held that cultural differ-
ence is an area distinct from race and national origin and therefore a
proper ground for departure. Many of the cultural difference cases
that have come up on appeal since Koon have been decided on
grounds other than culture, or the courts have held that even if a
departure based on cultural difference was available, it would not be
warranted under the facts of the cases before them.94 A major
concern for the courts seems to be the difficult issues raised by
departures based on culture, namely the possibility for overlap into
prohibited departure grounds.95 For example, in Contreras, the Tenth
89. Id. at 96-100.
90. Id. at 98-99.
91. Id. at 92.
92. Id. at 106 (quoting Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 136-37 (1991)).
93. Id. at 113-14.
94. See United States v. Guzman, 236 F.3d 830 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Tomono,
143 F.3d 1401 (11th Cir. 1998); United States v. Khang, 36 F.3d 77 (9th Cir. 1994).
95. Guzman, 236 F.3d at 832 (expressing the view that culture or ethnicity is not specifi-
cally listed in the sentencing guidelines as a prohibition because the drafters probably thought
that their prohibitions adequately covered such factors); Tomono, 143 F.3d at 1404 n.2 (stating
culture and national origin are "uncomfortably close" inquiries).
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Circuit noted the closeness between an argument based on culture
and an argument based on religion.96 The defendant was convicted of
numerous counts stemming from her involvement in her father's drug
conspiracy that should have warranted a range of 235 to 293 months
of imprisonment. 97 Instead, the district court departed downward, on
grounds other than culture, and sentenced the defendant to 120
months, which the government appealed. 98 Contreras argued, for the
first time on appeal, that the departure was warranted since the court
should "consider her unusually high susceptibility to her father's
influence due to her culture and religion." 99 Contreras argued that
obeisance to one's father is an integral part of Mexican-American
culture.'1° The Tenth Circuit stated that her argument cut deeper
than "cultural norms and principles" and was rooted in religion,
"[h]onor your father and your mother," making Contreras's argument
a prohibited one under the sentencing guidelines. 101
Similar to the Third Circuit's opinion in Yu, Judge Posner, writ-
ing for a Seventh Circuit majority, debated the arguments for and
against a cultural difference mitigation ground with dissenting Judge
Ripple in Guzman."°2 In Guzman, the defendant pled guilty to a
charge of conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, which would
have resulted in a sentence of fifty-seven to seventy-one months
imprisonment. The district court departed twenty-five levels because
of her Mexican cultural heritage, resulting in a sentence of three days
of time served, six months home detention, and two years of super-
vised release.103 The district court granted the departure on the basis
that, inter alia, one of the other persons involved in the conspiracy
was the defendant's boyfriend, and "Mexican cultural norms dictated
submission to her boyfriend's will."1
Despite the fact that the district court based the mitigation on a
factor other than race or national origin, Judge Posner opined that
this type of mitigation would only lead to the unraveling of the
96. United States v. Contreras, 180 F.3d 1204, 1212 n.4 (10th Cir. 1999).
97. Id. at 1207 (defendant convicted of "conspiracy, investment of illicit drug profits, and
two counts of money laundering").
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1212 n.4.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. United States v. Guzman, 236 F.3d 830 (7th Cir. 2001).
103. Id. at 831.
104. Id. at 831-32.
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sentencing guidelines. 0 5 To demonstrate this chain of undoing, he
first likened culture as synonymous with ethnicity.'06 Then, he noted
that national origin and religion are often correlated with ethnicity.107
Although not indicative of the groups that have historically received
preferential treatment, thereby necessitating the need for sentencing
reform, Judge Posner then concluded that "[a] judge who wanted to
give a break to a black defendant, or a woman, or a Muslim, or a
Colombian would have no difficulty pointing to ethnic characteristics
that distinguished the defendant from a white male whose ancestors
had come to America on the Mayflower."' 8  This result would
controvert the ideals of uniformity and objectivity. 09
Even though the decision to mitigate would be discretionary and
the instances in which defendants have requested departures based
upon cultural difference have stemmed predominantly from situa-
tions involving victimless crimes,"0 Judge Posner continued his tirade
against cultural difference considerations by highlighting what he
considered to be a danger of a whole class of crime victims being
denied protection of the law due to consideration of culture in
sentencing."' For instance, Judge Posner worried that a man might
beat his wife only to blame the violence on his patriarchal upbring-
ing."2 Despite these proffered dangers, the Seventh Circuit did not
expressly hold that culture could not be a factor in sentencing.
Instead, it held that what the district court considered as culture was
really just a blend of two forbidden factors, gender and national
origin.'
Judge Ripple supported his dissenting opinion that culture
should be a permissible departure ground by pointing to areas of the
legal system that already carved out a distinction between culture and
prohibited areas such as race and national origin, by buttressing the
validity of such a distinction with academic literature, and by address-





110. See, e.g., United States v. Contreras, 180 F.3d 1204 (10th Cir. 1999) (involving
conspiracy to distribute drugs); United States v. Tomono, 143 F.3d 1401 (11th Cir. 1999)
(involving turtle smuggling); United States v. Yu, 954 F.2d 951 (3d Cir. 1992) (involving bribery
of a government official).
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ing the parade of horribles presented by the majority with a practical
look at when and under what circumstances a judge would utilize
culture as a mitigating factor.1 4 First, he offered other legal sources
to highlight that culture has been described in the law as being
comprised of one's behavioral characteristics, rather than one's
immutable characteristics, such as race, gender, or national origin.,, 5
For example, Oregon's definition of cultural heritage is distinguished
from race or national origin: "'Cultural heritage' means the language,
customary beliefs, social norms, and material traits including, but not
limited to the dress, food, music and dance of a racial, religious or
social group that is transmitted from one generation to another.1116 In
addition, Judge Ripple quoted an anthropologist, Melville Herskovits,
to show that academic literature supported this distinction: "Race,
nationality, language, and culture are in actuality independent
variables. They meet only in the persons of given individuals who
belong to a particular race, are citizens of a specific nation, speak a
certain language, and live in accordance with the traditions of their
society."" 7
Finding culture to be sufficiently distinct from the forbidden fac-
tors under the sentencing guidelines, Judge Ripple concluded by
addressing the potential dangers highlighted by Judge Posner. Judge
Ripple characterized culture as an unmentioned factor that would
only justify a departure if present in a case to an extraordinary
degree.1 8 This need for the presence of culture to be unusually
influential coupled with the judge's ability to weed out culture claims
based upon impermissible factors, such as immutable characteristics
rather than behavioral ones, justifies that the mechanics and applica-
tion of culture as a mitigating factor would be sound." 9 Similar to
Judge Becker's detailed analysis in Yu, Judge Ripple's endorsement
of cultural difference ended in a stalemate, as the Seventh Circuit left
unsettled the issue of whether cultural difference could be used as a
basis for departure.20
114. Id. at 834-39 (Ripple, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 836. (Ripple, J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 837 n.3 (Ripple, J., dissenting) (quoting OR. ADMIN. R. 413-070-0010 (1998)).
117. Id. at 838 (Ripple, J., dissenting) (quoting MELVILLE J. HERSKOVITS, MAN AND HIS
WORKS 149 (1967)).
118. Id. (Ripple, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 835. (Ripple, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 833.
2003]
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
D. Post-Koon Cultural Assimilation Cases
Although no circuit has expressly held that cultural difference is
a proper consideration in sentencing, surprisingly the Fifth,
12' Ninth, 2
and Eleventh Circuits' 23 have held that a defendant's culture may be
considered in sentencing if the culture is consistent with that of U.S.
cultural norms. Cultural difference and cultural assimilation argu-
ments have been raised primarily in the context of victimless crimes
in which defendants advocate that their cultural beliefs warrant
mitigation in sentencing, in part because their cultures makes their
illegal actions more understandable. Yet, in comparing the two, a
seeming double standard exists as courts allow a defendant's culture
to mitigate a sentence if that culture coincides with the American
majority, but disallow mitigation if the culture differs from the
majority's. Intuitively, American society should hold a person more
assimilated to U.S. culture to a higher standard of lawfulness and be
less sympathetic when that person breaks the law, while being more
sympathetic to a new immigrant. A brief overview of the use of the
cultural assimilation claim will illustrate this disparity, which will be
further analyzed in Part IV of this Note.
The Ninth Circuit case of Lipman is instructive for understand-
ing the use of cultural assimilation. 2 4  Lipman was deported after
losing his permanent resident status due to various felony convic-
tions.' He illegally reentered the U.S. and was arrested. 2 6 He pled
guilty to one count of illegal reentry 27 and urged the district court to
grant a downward departure from the sentencing guidelines due to his
assimilation into U.S. culture. 128 Lipman argued that he was different
121. United States v. Rodriguez-Montelongo, 263 F.3d 429 (2001).
122. United States v. Lipman, 133 F.3d 726 (9th Cir. 1998).
123. United States v. Sanchez-Valencia, 148 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 1998).
124. 133 F.2d at 726. Cf. United States v. Bautista, 258 F.3d 602, 607 (7th Cir. 2001).
Bautista tried to use cultural assimilation as a grounds for mitigation, focusing on the effect of
his sentence, not on the act he committed. Bautista noted the amount of time he had spent in
the U.S. and the contacts that he had in the U.S., which persuaded the district court judge to
grant him a departure because, "the idea of this young man.., whose only real meaningful
contacts are with his family[,] being separated from his family and being sent back to a place
where he hasn't been since he was 12 years old.., is quite unusual." Id. at 604-05. The Seventh
Circuit rejected Bautista's use of cultural assimilation, in part because it went to the effects of
his punishment rather than his culpability. Id. at 607.
125. Lipman, 133 F.3d at 728.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. ("At sentencing, Lipman requested a downward departure pursuant to U.S.S.G. §
5K2.0 on the ground of 'cultural assimilation."').
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from the typical person convicted of entering the U.S. illegally
because his entry was not motivated by "economic needs"129; rather,
he was motivated by cultural ties in the U.S.3 ° Lipman had lived in
the U.S. for twenty-three years, received his education in the U.S.,
married a U.S. citizen, fathered seven children in the U.S., and
claimed he decided to reenter the U.S. to visit his daughter when he
heard she had been the victim of sexual assault.' The district court
refused to grant the departure.13  Lipman appealed stating that the
district court improperly held that it lacked the authority to grant a
departure on this basis.
133
The Ninth Circuit relied on U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual §
5K2.0, which states that a judge must consider whether "there exists
an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree,
not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commis-
sion[,]"'134 and on Koon's affirmation of departure jurisprudence and
held that district courts have the authority to consider a defendant's
"cultural assimilation" when granting departures from the sentencing
guidelines. 13 The Court suggested proper situations for the use of
cultural assimilation in sentencing reentry defendants: when "unusual
cultural ties" motivated the illegal reentry rather than economic
circumstances and when it appears that the defendant's culpability in
committing the illegal reentry should be lessened because he based
his act on cultural motives. 36
The Fifth Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit have followed the
Ninth Circuit's lead in allowing departures based upon cultural
assimilation. The Fifth Circuit reviewed, inter alia, its long list of
unpublished decisions in support of the use of cultural assimilation in
129. Id. at 729 (asserting that "the typical reentry defendant lacks cultural or familial ties to
the United States, is motivated only by economic needs, and 'come[s] to this country, commit[s]







135. Id. at 729-31. While Lipman clarified the law for other defendants and set in process
an affirmation of "cultural assimilation" as a basis for downward departures among some
circuits, he did not receive the benefit of his appeal. The Ninth Circuit held that the district
court did not deny Lipman a downward departure because it felt it lacked the authority to
consider "cultural assimilation," but rather because Lipman's case was not sufficiently
"unusual" or "atypical" from similarly situated defendants, and affirmed the lower court's
holding. Id. at 731-32.
136. Id. at 731.
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sentencing and the Lipman decision in its determination that cultural
assimilation is a proper basis for departure under the sentencing
guidelines. 137  The Eleventh Circuit has not expressly held that
cultural assimilation is a permissible factor under the sentencing
guidelines, but has stated that district courts should know of their
ability to depart based upon cultural assimilation because of Lip-
man.138  Other circuits have decided cases on other issues when
confronted with the cultural assimilation question. 139  Thus, the
current state of the law appears to stand for a pejorative double
standard, allowing the culture of the majority to serve as a mitigating
factor for wrongdoing, but not allowing diverse cultural experiences
to even be a consideration.
III. THE CULTURAL DEFENSE IN CRIMINAL LAW
Sentencing is not the only area in which commentators have ad-
vocated the use of cultural considerations to mitigate or eliminate a
charge; there has also been the desire to have an official cultural
defense in the criminal law. For purposes of analogy, this section
discusses the major arguments in favor of a cultural defense in
criminal law, since many of the arguments and applications between
the cultural defense theory and the use of cultural difference in
sentencing are similar. The cultural defense is an affirmative defense
where (1) the defendant did not know that her actions were unlawful
because the actions were consistent with or accepted in her culture or
(2) the defendant was compelled to commit the illegal act because her
culture so dictated.1 40  One of the main arguments for the cultural
137. United States v. Rodriguez-Montelongo, 263 F.3d 429, 433 (5th Cir. 2001).
138. United States v. Sanchez-Valencia, 148 F.3d 1273, 1274 (11th Cir. 1998).
139. Without ruling on the accuracy of the respective district courts' rulings, all of the
following unpublished court of appeals decisions found that the district court assumed it had the
authority to depart based on cultural assimilation, but elected to not do so. Therefore, none of
the cases were found to be properly on appeal, all were dismissed, and the question of cultural
assimilation was evaded. See United States v. Valdez-Trujillo, No. 00-1154, 2001 U.S. App.
LEXIS 13767 (6th Cir. June 6, 2001); United States v. Bustos-Castadena, No. 00-4867, 2001 U.S.
App. LEXIS 10633 (4th Cir. May 23, 2001); United States v. Campos, No. 00-2291SI, 2001 U.S.
App. LEXIS 8839 (8th Cir. May 7, 2001); United States v. Ulloa-Porras, No. 00-8023, 2001 U.S.
App. LEXIS 196 (10th Cir. Jan. 8, 2001).
140. Renteln, supra note 17, at 439 (limiting the defense to "immigrants, refugees and
indigenous people"); Note, The Cultural Defense in the Criminal Law, 99 HARv. L. REv. 1293,
1299-1300 (1986). An exhaustive comparison between the cultural defense and the use of
culture only at sentencing is beyond the parameters of this Note. For an extensive comparison
between the two, see Damian W. Sikora, Note, Differing Cultures, Differing Culpabilities?: A
Sensible Alternative: Using Cultural Circumstances as a Mitigating Factor in Sentencing, 62 OHIO
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defense is that its use would further the goals of individualized
justice.14
1
Although our justice system values the ideal that ignorance of
the law is no excuse, the cultural defense theory and the application
of individualized justice is warranted when one focuses on the words
that follow this famous quotation: "Ignorance of the law excuses no
man; not that all men know the law, but because 'tis an excuse every
man will plead, and no man can tell how to refute him.' ' 14 Thus,
even though consideration of a defendant's ignorance was seen as
equitable and just, ignorance was not accepted as an excuse because
of the apparent inability to distinguish between true and false
claims.1 43 Cultural defense theory states that a judge and jury might
be able to more readily discern true and false claims of ignorance, and
that the failure to do so might be a grave inequity.'- Hence, while it
might be fair to impute knowledge of American law to persons raised
in this country, by contrast it seems grossly unfair to hold a new
immigrant who has not been exposed to American "socializing
institutions," such as school and places of worship, to the same
standard.
45
Application of individualized justice through the cultural defense
theory has been argued as a furtherance of the goals of punishment,
namely retribution." 6 Retribution is centered upon the idea of
proportionality -an eye for an eye-the notion that punishment
should fit the crime.1 47  Cultural defense theory and individualized
justice follow this idea by allowing a defendant who acted because of
cultural reasons to be seen as less culpable, and therefore deserving of
a lesser punishment. 148 The insistence upon examining why a defen-
ST. L.J. 1695 (2001). Sikora urges the use of culture at sentencing, but due to the focus of his
article does not engage in a detailed analysis between culture and the proscriptions in the
sentencing guidelines. Id. at 1718 n.135.
141. See Note, supra note 140, at 1301 (arguing that a cultural defense theory would further
the notion of cultural pluralism and thus help to foster and maintain a culturally diverse
society).
142. Nancy A. Wanderer & Catherine R. Connors, Culture and Crime: Kargar and the
Existing Framework for a Cultural Defense, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 829, 851 (1999) (quoting JOHN
SELDEN, TABLE TALK 65 (1689) (changing original to use modem spelling)) (emphasis
removed). For more discussion of cultural considerations at sentencing furthering the idea of
individualized justice, see Gomez, supra note 17, at 357-61; Sikora, supra note 140, at 1722.
143. Id.
144. See Note, supra note 140, at 1299.
145. Id.





dant acted as she did is an important part of individualized justice.
Although one who steals for personal gain and one who steals to feed
her children are both thieves, "the latter is in some sense less guilty
morally. 1' 49 Whether one killed in self-defense or whether one killed
without provocation can make the difference between a refusal to
prosecute and a life sentence. 150 Thus, "[i]f the legal system is to
understand what motivates the actions of another, it must understand
that person's culture" and account for it when judging the person. 151
Proponents have argued that there is a particular need for an of-
ficial cultural defense because the defense does not fit neatly into any
of the existing defenses or grounds for mitigation."' For example, the
insanity defense requires that some sort of mental disorder be pre-
sent, which the defendant seeking to use a cultural defense likely does
not have, and even if the judge believed some sort of strained insanity
defense, the result would be a judicial determination of lunacy, which
is not only an affront to the defendant but also an affront to the
defendant's culture. 53 In addition, lack of mens rea is troublesome
because the defendant probably did intend the action; however, her
culture dictated that the action was not blameworthy. 5 4 There is also
concern about leaving the defendant's fate in the hands of prosecu-
tors who have the discretion to charge and judges who have the
discretion to sentence when the legal system can be argued to "have
traditionally been biased against the very groups that the defense is
intended to benefit.' 1 55
Application of the cultural defense requires the judge to consider
a wide array of factors, including, inter alia, the defendant's probabil-
149. Id. at 443 ("[M]motive is critical in establishing blameworthiness.").
150. Id. at 444.
151. Id. at 445; see also Glueck, supra note 24, at 62:
The theory is that although, for instance, a burglary is always a burglary, not all bur-
glars are alike in the motivations of their crime, in their mental and emotional makeup,
social background, probability of recidivism and other circumstances which are cer-
tainly every bit as relevant to the aim of protecting society as is the crime itself, if not
more so. Such factors, to some extent, make each crime a unique event and each
criminal a unique individual.
152. Renteln, supra note 17, at 445-87 (examining the viability of culture as a defense under
numerous existing defenses, such as necessity, duress, insanity and provocation); Note, supra
note 140, at 1293-96.
153. Note, supra note 140, at 1296-97.
154. Id. For an exhaustive examination of the problems inherent in forcing the cultural
defense into pre-existing defenses, see Renteln, supra note 17, at 445-87.
155. Note, supra note 140, at 1297-98 ("The combination of covertness and unfettered
discretion is a particularly troubling method for dealing with cultural factors because this
combination has historically presented an opportunity for officials to exercise prejudice against
cultural minorities.").
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ity of recidivism, the gravity of the crime, whether the victim, if any,
was a member of the defendant's cultural group, and the degree to
which the defendant has been assimilated into American culture.
56
All of the above factors should be discretionary. For instance, there
should not be a set time period in which assimilation is deemed to
occur, since the process will largely be fact-specific.157 Professor
Renteln argues that the cultural defense should serve as a partial
excuse: if the defendant did commit a crime, it would be unjust to let
the defendant go free, but if the defendant committed the crime
because in her culture the act was not blameworthy or because her
culture compelled her behavior, it would be unjust to charge and treat
her the same as a defendant who reasonably should have known the
consequences of her actions. 158 Thus, the partial defense fulfills the
idea of retribution, a punishment proportional to one's moral culpa-
bility. 5 9
A few of the concerns raised regarding the implementation and
rationale of an official culture theory center on the scope of cultural
defense and its implications for society. A particular concern in the
cultural defense theory is how to prevent a surplus of defendants
from asserting attenuated cultural defense claims, which, if un-
checked, might leave the legal system with the task of weeding
through a myriad of invalid claims.16° There is also the concern that
the defenses may be proffered based upon a defendant's membership
in some assorted subculture which society might not view as a desir-
able grounds for mitigation, such as membership in gang culture or
aristocrats claiming a "'Great Gatsby' defense when they drive while
intoxicated.' 16 1 Professor Renteln concedes that there may be no real
way to weed out such claims other than by the judge and jury refusing
to give them credibility. 62 Another concern focuses on whether the
victim will receive full protection under the law where a cultural
defense might drastically reduce or eliminate a defendant's charge,
particularly if the victim is from a historically disadvantaged group
156. Id. at 1308-10.
157. Renteln, supra note 17, at 496 ("There is no evidence indicating that cultural adapta-
tion and assimilation occur within any finite time period.").
158. Id. at 490-91.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 497; see also Note, supra note 140, at 1308 ("Judicial rejection of a cultural
defense may rest on the concern that once the defense is introduced, it will be impossible to
define its proper scope.").
161. Renteln, supra note 17, at 497.
162. Id. at 498.
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such as minorities, women, and children. 63 These aforementioned
concerns might be probative of why an official cultural defense has
not been adopted.
IV. CULTURAL DIFFERENCE AS A PROPER BASIS FOR DOWNWARD
DEPARTURES IN SENTENCING
This section first analyzes culture and depicts why cultural differ-
ence should be viewed as distinct from prohibited areas under the
sentencing guidelines. Next, the section turns to the application of
cultural difference as a mitigating factor and argues that many of the
problems identified in applying a cultural defense are drastically
reduced when culture is used, instead, in the sentencing stage.
Attention is then given to policy considerations. Culture in sentenc-
ing will be detailed as consistent with our nation's ideals of pluralism
and multiculturalism, and the grave discrepancy of allowing a cultural
assimilation claim as opposed to a cultural difference claim will be
addressed. In addition, it will be evident why the use of culture
difference remains consistent with the goals of sentencing and indi-
vidualized justice. All of this leads to the conclusion that cultural
difference should be a recognized departure ground for sentencing.
An examination of what facets of society are embodied by cul-
ture leads to the conclusion that culture is an expansive term, one that
is much broader and more encompassing than prohibited considera-
tions such as race and national origin. Culture has been used to
encapsulate numerous aspects of life such as language, societal norms,
politics, food, dress, customary beliefs, child-rearing traits, shared way
of life, and characteristics passed from one generation to the next.164
163. United States v. Guzman, 236 F.3d 830, 833 (7th Cir. 2001); Daina C. Chiu, The
Cultural Defense: Beyond Exclusion, Assimilation, and Guilty Liberalism, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1053,
1103-12 (1994) (providing a comprehensive overview of the arguments against the use of a
cultural defense).
164. See OR. ADMIN. R. 413-070-0010 (1998) (defining culture as "the language, customary
beliefs, social norms, and material traits including, but not limited to the dress, food, music and
dance of a racial, religious or social group that are transmitted from one generation to
another"); Larry L. Naylor, Culture and Cultural Groupings, in CULTURAL DIVERSITY IN THE
UNITED STATES 3, 7 (Larry L. Naylor ed., 1997) (describing culture as the "beliefs, behaviors,
customs, or a total way of life" shared by those living in the same geographical boundaries);
Alison Dundes Renteln, Clash of Civilizations? Cultural Differences in the Development and
Interpretation of International Law, 92 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 232, 233 (1998) (describing
culture as including "such things as language, religion, politics, child-rearing practices and
attire").
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Culture is distinct from prohibited areas such as race and na-
tional origin because it is not dependent upon where a particular
person was born or a person's lineage, but rather upon a myriad of
learned and acquired factors, stemming from, for example, the type of
socializing institutions the person was exposed to during that person's
formative years. If culture were solely dependent on national origin,
it would lead to the absurd result that one who was born and raised in
France should absolutely share the same cultural beliefs and practices
as one who was born in France but raised in America. If culture were
solely dependent on race or ethnicity, it would mean that regardless
of what type of community or values one was raised in, a person of
Chinese descent who is a Chinese national should absolutely share
the same cultural beliefs and practices as a third or fourth generation
Chinese-American-simply because the two are both of Chinese
lineage. Thus, as opposed to immutable characteristics that people
cannot change, such as race or national origin, people learn and
acquire their culture from their society of upbringing in a process
termed "enculturation."1 65 While the process of enculturation is often
subtle, it can lead to great divergences in the practices, beliefs, and
traditions among different groups of people. 166 Practices that are
considered a societal norm in one group of people may be a societal
taboo or even a legal wrong in another.
Culture should also be viewed as distinct from prohibited areas
of the sentencing guidelines upon an examination of why certain
factors are prohibited from consideration in sentencing. While the
legislative history surrounding this issue is scant at best, it is apparent
that the legislative committee wanted to make absolutely clear that it
would not be appropriate for preferential treatment to be given to
defendants of a particular race or religion.1 67 This is similar to Judge
Posner's concern voiced in Guzman.16 Allowing cultural difference
as a mitigating factor, however, would not likely run afoul of these
concerns. For example, a judge is not permitted to issue a departure
simply because a defendant is Mexican-American. That is prohibited
165. Renteln, supra note 164, at 233.
166. See id. at 232 (describing jokingly how different persons would set out to write a book
on "The Elephant": "The Englishman gives his paper on 'Elephant Hunting in India.' The
Russian presents 'The Elephant and the Five-Year Plan.' The Italian offers 'The Elephant and
the Renaissance.' The Frenchman delivers 'Les Amours des Elephants' or 'the Elephant in the
Kitchen.' The German gives 'The Military Use of the Elephant.' Finally, the American rises to
give his paper on 'How to Build a Bigger and Better Elephant."').
167. S. REP. No. 98-473, at 38 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3220, 3221.
168. United States v. Guzman, 236 F.3d 830, 832 (7th Cir. 2001).
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by the sentencing guidelines. Nonetheless, a judge should be allowed
to consider, for instance, the defendant's cultural beliefs due to being
raised in a Mexican-American community. A judge would consider
whether the norms in that society tended to negate the defendant's
understanding that what he or she did was wrong. If this is the case,
the judge might then issue a departure from the sentencing guide-
lines. The next five defendants before the judge might be Mexican-
American, and all five might not warrant departures because their
actions were clearly unacceptable in their culture of upbringing and in
the majority culture. Thus, the first defendant received a mitigation,
not for being Mexican-American, but because the defendant's
learned and acquired beliefs lessened his or her level of blameworthi-
ness.
In addition, there are procedural safeguards that would prohibit
judges from disguising preferences for one group or another behind a
sentencing mitigation falsely based on cultural difference. When
issuing a departure, a judge must clearly state why he or she is depart-
ing,169 and that departure is subject to appellate review.170 Thus, a
departure that is not supported by anything other than favoritism to a
group of people would most certainly be overturned, even under an
abuse of discretion standard. Therefore, cultural difference as a
mitigating factor is distinct from race and national origin, because the
reasons for prohibiting race and national origin would not manifest in
a cultural difference claim.
The cultural difference factor would be more straightforward and
easily applied at the sentencing stage than at the trial stage. Namely,
at the sentencing stage the scope of the cultural claim could be more
easily limited. In evaluating whether culture should be a proper basis
for downward departures, a defendant's culture should be considered
if the culture in question pertains to "national culture" '71 or the
culture of a "bona fide ethnic group. ' 17 2 This would have the effect of
barring use of culture as a mitigating factor to one who grew up in a
drug culture and allowing culture to be considered for one who grew
up on a Native American reservation. Confining a cultural definition
to that of nationalities and ethnic groups and not to that of counter-
cultures and subcultures has been a task with which scholars advocat-
169. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (1994).
170. 18 U.S.C. §3742(a)-(b) (1994).
171. See Renteln, supra note 164, at 233.
172. Renteln, supra note 17, at 497.
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ing for some type of cultural defense in criminal law have long
grappled.173  Under the sentencing guidelines, however, limiting
culture to that of ethnic minorities is markedly simpler, because of
what can and cannot be considered under the sentencing guidelines.
For example, as Judge Becker noted in his dissent in Yu, a defendant
cannot successfully plead for a downward departure based on being
raised in an impoverished culture because U.S. Sentencing Guideline
Manual § 5H1.10 specifically forbids consideration of socioeconomic
status in sentencing.17 4 Similarly, a defendant could not claim that she
deserves a downward departure based on growing up in the culture of
a broken home since U.S. Sentencing Guideline Manual § 5H1.12
proscribes consideration of one's lack of guidance as a youth.
17 5
While the sentencing guidelines would not limit every type of
counterculture and subculture from asserting cultural difference as a
means for downward departures, the sentencing guidelines are an
effective bar to many of them, much more so than a bare cultural
defense claim would be. As recognized by the advocates of the
cultural defense theory, it would be impossible to bar every subcul-
ture from asserting culture as a basis for downward departure;
however, this does not necessitate that culture should not be a
permissible basis because courts still retain discretion in deciding
whether or not to grant departures.176 The discretion of the courts,
plus the added limitations imposed by the sentencing guidelines,
eliminates much of the struggle in reserving the cultural assertion for
bona fide ethnic minorities or those belonging to a national culture.
177
Cultural difference should be a permissible factor for sentencing
because it is consistent with policy ideals of pluralism and multicul-
turalism. There is an especially great need for cultural difference to
be recognized as a permissible factor considering that circuits are
allowing cultural assimilation to be a factor in sentencing. If left as is,
173. E.g., id. (Professor Renteln reasons that definitions of subcultures pertain more to class
distinctions rather than cultural distinctions and that the worldviews of those in subcultures is
not radically different from that of those in the dominant culture. However, Professor Renteln
concedes that it may not be possible to thwart the use of the cultural defense by members of
subcultures.).
174. United States v. Yu, 954 F.2d 951, 958 (3d Cir. 1992) (Becker, J., dissenting).
175. See also id. (Becker, J., dissenting) ("[I]f a 'cultural differences' claim is a surrogate for
an alcohol-related excuse, it must fail because USSG § 5H1.4 specifically refuses to allow abuse
of alcohol to reduce culpability.").
176. Renteln, supra note 17, at 497.
177. As Judge Becker noted in Yu regarding the floodgates concern: "In sum, the parade of
horribles is not only irrelevant to our inquiry, but would not happen in any event." 954 F.2d at
957 (Becker, J., dissenting).
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the message conveyed contravenes important policy ideals.178 The
message conveyed by promoting cultural assimilation and refusing to
validate cultural difference is the notion that the legal system will
consider the defendant as an individual only if the defendant's
cultural identity is that of an American, stripped of any practices or
behaviors from his or her native land. This notion defies our nation's
ideals of pluralism and multiculturalism.
In addition, the allowance of cultural assimilation and not cul-
tural difference thwarts basic ideas of fairness in sentencing. While
the Ninth Circuit argued that a defendant who illegally reentered the
United States for cultural reasons was more sympathetic than one
who illegally reentered for economic gain, 179 similar reasoning would
dictate that a defendant who has become fully assimilated in U.S.
culture is less sympathetic than a defendant who is a recent immigrant
and, based upon her native culture, believed that her actions were
acceptable. Certainly, the latter defendant would seem to be less
blameworthy, for she acted in compliance with her upbringing and in
ignorance of any legal wrong. The former person committed her
actions knowing full well the wrongfulness of them. And yet, while
the sympathetic reentry defendant is given more lenient sentencing
considerations, no circuit has specifically approved the use of cultural
difference as a mitigating factor for the recent immigrant defendant.
The use of cultural difference is also consistent with the major
goal in sentencing, namely retribution, or the demand for proportion-
ality between the action and the punishment.80 One of the concerns
of using culture as an affirmative defense and in sentencing is that the
victim is denied full protection under the law, and thus, the victim and
society are robbed of the satisfaction of "just deserts."'81 However,
retribution is not a problem in downward departures based upon
cultural difference. First, almost all the cases in which federal courts
of appeals have reviewed cultural difference sentencing claims
178. Courts have not considered cultural assimilation as running afoul of the forbidden
factors of race or national origin. For instance, a cultural assimilation defendant is not being
given a departure based upon the norms of his or her country of origin or race, but rather
because of the degree of his or her enculturation to U.S. culture. This is, however, a distinction
without a difference. In one situation, the courts are allowing the consideration of a defendant's
life beliefs or culture and saying that it is proper, and in the other situation, the courts are
discouraging the consideration of a defendant's life beliefs or culture as being prohibited under
the guidelines.
179. United States v. Lipman, 133 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 1998).
180. See United States ex rel. D'Agostino v. Keohane, 877 F.2d 1167, 1170 (3d Cir. 1989).
181. United States v. Guzman, 236 F.3d 830, 833 (7th Cir. 2001).
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involved victimless crimes. For instance, Yu involved bribery of a
government official, 182 Contreras entailed conspiracy to distribute
drugs,183 and Tomono was convicted of importing illegal turtles.184
These are not crimes in which there is a readily apparent, sympathetic
victim demanding the legal system take an eye for an eye. This is not
to say that such a situation would never arise; however, even if it did,
a judge could still exercise discretion and not grant a downward
departure in a violent or heinous crime or in a crime with a sympa-
thetic victim. Nonetheless, as the need for a cultural mitigating factor
seems to arise most often in victimless crimes, the desire for retribu-
tion is lessened, and therefore a lessened sentence would be appro-
priate if the defendant has shown that her culture makes her unlike
the typical defendant convicted of this crime.
Moreover, even if there is a marked societal desire for retribu-
tion, the cultural evidence is not being admitted to negate the defen-
dant's liability. Unlike the cultural defense, cultural difference cases
arise at sentencing, when the defendant's guilt has already been
established. Thus, the desire for retribution should be satiated to
some extent in the knowledge that the defendant has already had
some "just deserts" -being branded a criminal.
Uniformity in sentencing would also not be disturbed by a cul-
tural consideration claim. The predetermined sentencing punishment
terms would not be upset by a vast amount of departures. The issue
has only been raised at the appellate level a handful of times. In
addition, the sentencing guidelines warrant that a departure is appro-
priate for an unmentioned factor, only if that factor, in this case
cultural difference, is influential to the defendant to an extraordinary
degree. Thus, for the majority of cases, the predetermined propor-
tionality between the action and the guidelines punishment would be
maintained.
In cases where a departure is warranted because culture was pre-
sent to an extraordinary degree, a different sort of proportionality
would take precedence, that of individualized justice185-the belief
182. Yu, 954 F.2d at 951.
183. United States v. Contreras, 180 F.3d 1204 (10th Cir. 1999).
184. United States v. Tomono, 143 F.3d 1401 (11th Cir. 1998).
185. Glueck, supra note 24, at 63:
[T]o 'individualize' the sentence in the case of any specific offender means, first, to
differentiate him from other offenders in personality, character, sociocultural back-
ground, the motivations of his crime and his particular potentialities for reform or
recidivism and, secondly, to determine which, among a range of punitive, corrective
psychiatric and social measures, is best adapted to solve the individualized set of prob-
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that it would be grossly unfair to punish a defendant who committed
an action believing the action to be acceptable because of his or her
cultural norms the same as a defendant who grew up in America and
should have known the illegality of his or her actions. It is the notion
that punishments should fit the particular defendant, not the particu-
lar crime.8 6 The Supreme Court stated in Koon that this type of
individualized sentencing was not thwarted by the adoption of the
sentencing guidelines.187
The goal of the sentencing guidelines is, of course, to reduce un-
justified disparities and so reach towards the evenhandedness and
neutrality that are the distinguishing marks of any principled system
of justice. In this respect, the sentencing guidelines provide uniform-
ity, predictability, and a degree of detachment lacking in our earlier
system. It must be remembered, however, that it has been uniform
and constant in the federal judicial tradition for the sentencing judge
to consider every convicted person as an individual and every case as
a "unique study in the human failings that sometimes mitigate,
sometimes magnify, the crime and the punishment to ensue." 188
This call for individualized sentencing advances the judicial sys-
tem's goal of pluralism and respect for diversity by taking into con-
sideration practices and behaviors outside that of the dominant
group. Courts can achieve individualized sentencing by recognizing
the defendant as an individual and taking account of his or her
cultural beliefs that may have motivated his or her actions. Consider-
ing all of the aforementioned reasons, the legality and need for a
departure ground based on cultural difference is apparent.
CONCLUSION
The sentencing decision can be seen as "the symbolic keystone of
the criminal justice system" as it implicates the "goals of equal justice
under the law[,]" "individualized justice with punishment tailored to
the offender[,]" and "society's moral principles and highest values-
lems presented by that offender in such a way as materially to reduce the probability of
his committing crimes in the future.
186. United States v. Lara, 905 F.2d 599, 604 (2d Cir. 1990) (finding no merit to the
argument that courts are limited in their sentencing considerations to the characteristics of
defendants that are directly related to the crimes).
187. Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 92 (1996).
188. Id. at 113.
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life and liberty[.]" '89 To the criminal defendant who is found guilty
for following his or her cultural norms, equal justice, individualized
justice, life, and liberty equate to and demand consideration of the
extent that his or her cultural upbringing affected his or her actions.
In this amalgam of values inherent in criminal law and in sentencing,
the legal system should recognize that culture is embodied in each of
them, and specifically allow departures in sentencing based upon
cultural difference.
189. 1 RESEARCH ON SENTENCING: THE SEARCH FOR REFORM 1 (Alfred Blumstein et al.
eds., 1983).
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